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ABSTRACT 
Greece in 1928 viewed the anchoring to the Gold Exchange Standard as 
the imperative choice of the time in order to implant financial credibility 
and carry over an ambitious plan of reforms to modernise the economy. 
But after the pound sterling exited the system in 1931, Greece, instead 
of following suit, chose a defence that drove interest rates at high levels, 
squeezed the real economy and exhausted foreign reserves. Unable to 
borrow from abroad, it quitted the system in 1932 and the Drachma was 
heavily devalued. Despite a rise in competitiveness, the erosion of real 
incomes cut domestic demand, unemployment continued to rise and the 
country entered a period of acute social and political instability. The 
lessons are perhaps relevant today for the costs that Greece would face 
by exiting the Eurozone. 
A model of Balance of Payments crises with partial capital controls is 
employed to analyze the response of currency pegs to external shocks 
and examine under which circumstances the regime collapses. Its main 
predictions are found to be in agreement with the actual outcomes in 
1932 
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Currency crisis and collapse 
in interwar Greece: 
Predicament or Policy Failure? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A byproduct of the current Greek debt crisis is a thriving literature based 
on the intellectual speculation – sometimes on a market one as well –
that Greece is bound to fail the stabilization process and, therefore, exit 
the Eurozone and default. The argument goes that under the present 
fiscal austerity and currency fixity, recession will deepen destroying jobs 
and igniting social unrest; see Roubini (2011). After abandoning the 
Euro, Greece is assumed to become master of its fate so that she prints 
her own money, rebukes the austerity program, and – of course - 
devalues, perhaps heavily. A concomitant option would be to repudiate 
obligations since all public debt is presently denominated in Euro and a 
steep devaluation would make its servicing intolerable; see Feldstein 
(2011). But, the argument continues, this is an affordable cost as the 
economy soon will assume a growth path, with competitiveness and 
employment restored, and reforms advancing; see Azariadis (2011).  
If not convincing enough, the above arguments are enriched by historical 
clichés, according to which Greece will fail because under similar 
circumstances it has also failed in the past. Hartwich (2011) argues that 
one such episode was the country leaving the Latin Monetary Union 
(LMU) in 1908 and concludes that “Greece is a basket case”. However, 
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the important fact rather was that Greece successfully managed to stay 
in LMU for forty years (since 1868), overcoming major deficiencies in the 
domestic economy and the challenge of globalization in late 19
th
 
century; for a description see Lazaretou (1999). It was only after the ill-
fated war in 1897 that Greece became unable to service the debt and 
pay retributions to Ottoman Turkey, that LMU participation looked 
untenable. In any case Greece joined back in 1910, but only for a few 
more years as most members exited the system after the outbreak of 
the Great War in 1914. 
The second and oft cited incident took place in 1932 when Greece 
abandoned the interwar Gold Exchange Standard (GES) and 
subsequently repudiated its debt. In contrast to conventional wisdom, 
neither the collapse was predetermined by some Greek history dictation, 
nor the post-collapse regime managed to cure the economic and social 
problems of the period. The same applies for the current situation in 
Greece, as recession is looming and the scenario of failing to stay in the 
Eurozone is advanced both by international analysts and critics at home
1
 
However, whether Greece fails or succeeds on this matter is an issue of 
policy, not one of fate.  
In this respect, it is useful to analyze the causes and consequences of the 
crisis in the 1930s and the present paper sets to analyze three points: 
First, to explain why joining the GES was a fully justified decision that 
helped Greece to ensure fiscal stability, acquire international credibility 
and establish access to low-cost finance. In comparison with the 
previous situation, improvement within the GES has been enormous. In 
                                                 
1
 For a relevant analysis see Christodoulakis (2012). 
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the 1920s, Greece was experiencing the contradicting consequences of 
being first a victorious power in the Great War and then a defeated 
nation in the campaign in Asia Minor, only a few years later. Greece had 
to rapidly absorb two million national refugees and integrate them in the 
economic and social framework. At the same time she had to modernize 
the economy and facilitate the financing of major productive projects to 
enhance regional development. A turning point was when the centre-left 
Party of Liberals won the elections of 1926. The new Government sought 
a more liberalized environment in trade and industry, the reduction of 
fiscal deficits and the establishment of a Central Bank that was deemed 
as a precondition for raising credibility in international markets, reducing 
the cost of borrowing and servicing the war-swollen debt. The crucial 
next step was participation in GES, and the decision was finally taken in 
1928. Authorities viewed the anchoring to Gold as the unique choice to 
implant financial credibility and carry over an ambitious plan for the 
modernisation of the economy. 
Within the GES, Greece managed a successful implementation of fiscal 
and structural policies in the domestic economy.  In just two years, 
public deficit and inflation were reduced, and several structural reforms 
were implemented to create a more liberalized economic environment 
and modernize the banking system. The Balance of Payments improved 
noticeably and growth resumed. Public debt in US dollars was reduced 
to almost half the level it had in the previous decade.  
The second aim of the paper is to describe the policy failures that led to 
the currency regime collapsing in 1932, despite the previous adjustment 
efforts. The pressure started to accumulate with the Great Depression, 
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though the Greek economy was not immediately hit as happened with 
other economies. Adherence to the GES remained unquestionable 
throughout, though fiscal austerity and a rise in interest rates dampened 
growth and unemployment started to rise. However, the main shock 
came when the pound sterling abandoned the system in September 
1931 sparking international panic and precipitating similar moves by 
other countries. Keeping most of the foreign exchange reserves in British 
currency, Greece incurred serious losses and defenses against a 
speculative attack abruptly weakened. At that point, Greek authorities 
made the critical mistake not to orderly follow the depreciation of the 
pound, but instead chose to fight for staying in the GES to the bitter end. 
As no international credit facility – let alone financial solidarity from 
other members of the system– was available at that time the game soon 
was over and Greece finally collapsed in April 1932. 
The third aim of the paper is to describe the consequences that 
abandonment of the GES had on the domestic front. Instead of a 
transition to a stable economy, the steep devaluation and the ensuing 
inflation eroded domestic demand and unemployment increased 
further, while debt repudiation tarnished the country’s credibility for 
many years and led to a dramatic political fall-out. If anything, the crisis 
and default of the 1930s is a lesson to be avoided rather than copied. 
The literature on Balance of Payments crises is employed to analyze the 
response of currency pegs to external shocks and see under which 
circumstances the regime becomes untenable. Building a dynamic model 
of foreign exchange reserves and the exchange rate, the paper explains 
the way the regime finally collapsed and highlights some policy 
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alternatives that could have been followed in 1931. In the early models 
developed by Krugman (1979) and Calvo (1987), collapse is taking place 
in predetermined time, when domestic credit follows a constant growth 
rate known to market participants. That was not the case for Greece in 
1931, where the fight to stay in the system lasted more than six months 
and the decision to abandon it was taken by the Government amid fears 
that reserves would be otherwise completely vanished. In Greece, credit 
growth was randomly influenced by the Central Bank, and, moreover, 
the imposition of some capital controls in 1931 meant that market 
players were not able to fully enforce their strategy. In the present 
formulation, partial capital controls are assumed to be in place and 
collapse occurs when the stock of foreign reserves falls to a critical level 
known only to the authorities. A unique equilibrium is derived and the 
predictions of the model are found to be in agreement with actual 
developments before and after the crisis. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
account of the reasons that led Greece along several western countries 
to adopt the Gold Exchange Standard. Section 3 describes the main 
episodes in defending the regime and the policies that aggravated 
recession and ultimately led to the collapse of the currency. Section 4 
presents a simple model of Balance of Payments crises, which is 
modified to portray how the Central Bank can use the level of foreign 
exchange reserves to mitigate the excessive rise in interest rates when 
an adverse shock hits the economy. Section 5 concludes.  
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2.  The quest for stability in Greece 
In the aftermath of the First World War, European nations were 
experiencing economic instability associated with exchange rate 
fluctuations, rampant inflation and lack of financing. In 1919, the United 
States decided to adopt the Gold Standard and this prompted the 
League of Nations to organize, one year later, the Paris Conference 
seeking exchange rate stability and some form of returning to the Gold 
Standard. The plan was based on complicated requirements, thus it was 
no wonder that little progress followed the proclamation. It was only 
after the horrifying shock of German hyperinflation in 1922, that the 
victor countries finally decided to endorse exchange rate fixity as the key 
factor to achieve economic stability. The Gold Exchange Standard was 
established at the Genoa Conference in 1922 and several countries 
rushed to join-in. 
The European postwar malaise notwithstanding, Greece was further hit 
in the early 1920s by its defeat in Asia Minor and the anomalous political 
situation that prevailed afterwards. As shown in Figure 1, public debt 
had reached alarming levels, first because of the military spending 
during World War I, and then because of the huge burden of the ill-fated 
campaign. The implementation of reforms looked implausible, inflation 
was at levels over 80% (see Figure 2), and the Drachma was unstoppably 
losing ground to both the UK sterling and the US dollar, (Figure 3).  
Greek money markets were suffering from the Drachma slide and there 
was massive capital flight to foreign banks. With a thin financing capacity 
at home, the government had to rely heavily on borrowing from 
international markets. In fact, most of the major loans were launched in 
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London and New York, and this made domestic investment activity to 
depend crucially on the capital inflows; for example, a loan of £ 4 m 
issued in London in 1928 was earmarked to finance specific investment 
projects. Besides, as pointed by Lazaretou (1999), borrowing from 
international markets was also seen as a way to encourage repatriation 
of Greek funds.  
As regularity of debt payments was not taken for granted, the question 
of Greek solvency was receiving extensive foreign press coverage. A 
documentation of how foreign investors adjusted their expectations 
about the viability of the financial system is given by Christodoulaki and 
Penzer (2004). As a proxy measure of the increasing market anxiety, they 
calculate a dominance index of the (usually bad) news on Greek debt 
developments relative to total information on Greece appearing in the 
British press and find it to rise steeply after 1925. Nervousness was 
spreading and sometimes led to openly hostile actions. The authors note 
one such case, in which the Allies got so estranged by domestic political 
developments that they cancelled the Book of Credits and imposed a 
general financial embargo on Greece.  From the status of an acclaimed 
war ally, the country lost face in the post-war market fields. 
In such an environment, joining the Gold Standard was rightly seen as a 
precondition to facilitate the influx of foreign capital essential for 
economic growth. The first step was the establishment of the Central 
Bank in April 1928 aiming to persuade foreign investors that financial 
practises would be more credible, and in May 1928 Greece joined the 
GES. As noted by Bordo and Rockoff (1996), adherence to the Gold 
Standard in the 1920s acted as a ‘seal of approval’ for sovereign debt of 
 8 
participant countries, and helped Greece as well to improve her status in 
international markets.  
Improvement, however, was not to the extent envisaged by Greek 
authorities. Recent econometric evidence by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) 
on interwar markets suggests that the return to the Gold Standard after 
the Great War did confer lower sovereign spreads to participants on 
servicing their debt. They note, however, that improvement neither 
reached the extent of the period before 1914, nor it was equally shared 
by all countries. In fact, Greece did not enjoy much of the reduced 
spreads in the pre-war system either, during which she was paying a 
large risk premium of 215 basis points, while most other countries were 
enjoying a zero spread. A similar discrepancy was experienced by Greece 
in the GES, for three reasons: 
First, because international investors scrutinized more carefully than 
before the sustainability of trade balances in each country and the 
appropriateness of the exchange rate level when entering the GES.  
Greece was characterized by chronic deficits (see Figure 4) and fixing the 
Drachma to the pre-war exchange rate with the UK pound sterling did 
not appear convincing as a cure for existing imbalances.  By deciding this 
rate, Greece hoped to convey a signal of international clout in the 
domestic political scene as a firm partner of Britain, but on economic 
grounds the decision was unfounded given the slim trade volumes 
between the two countries. In the second half of the 1920s, Greek 
exports to the UK were counting for only 12.2% of total volumes, while 
imports from the UK for just 13.4%. Trade volumes with the US were 
considerably higher, as were with Germany and Italy, and the exchange 
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rate should have been pegged to an average of the major trading 
currencies. Moreover, the British rate itself was out of context as Keynes 
famously remarked
2
 in account of the miscalculated restoration to its 
pre-war value. Shortly after, Great Britain went through a severe 
recession and, due to the credit meanness that prevailed, its industrial 
competitiveness was seriously undercut. Greece just copied the 
miscalculation and multiplied the consequences. 
Second, because Greece entered the GES too late and soon afterwards 
international recession was looming and undermined most of the 
expected benefits from an increased world demand. Domestic discount 
rates were reduced by 1929, but then rose again in 1931 to reflect the 
tightening of international credit after the Great Depression. The 
contraction in domestic credit cut domestic demand and the economy 
soon entered a period of prolonged recession. 
Third, because of the devastating competitive devaluations that 
followed: With recession spreading and deepening worldwide, the 
attractiveness of the GES was eroded and eventually abandonment 
became inevitable for many countries. After Greece joined in 1928, only 
three more countries followed, as the storm was gathering
3
: France 
joined the GES in September 1928, but only after a substantial 
devaluation of the franc; Japan joined in January 1930 but exited before 
the end of 1931, and, finally, Portugal made the shortest journey 
entering in July 1931 and jumping out of the ship just three months 
later. Similarly, the Nordic countries suspended the GES and devalued 
                                                 
2
 In the essay “The economic consequences of Mr. Churchill”, 1925. 
3
 Dates are taken from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), Table A1. 
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their currencies in 1931.  Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) document that 
all countries that either de jure or de facto devalued their currencies in 
the 1930s, came out of the recession faster. They note that in order to 
face economic downturn in the early 1930s, European nations could 
have conceived various policies to pursue, among them ‘… devaluation, 
protection, monetary expansion and fiscal stimulus’. But none of these 
policies was considered within the GES. 
In fact, the countries remaining in the GES were further tightening their 
monetary policy and this was hitting the borrowing costs for Greece. For 
example, the Bank of England raised the discount rate more than 
twofold, from 2.5% in May 1931 to 6% in September, in her own struggle 
to sustain the exchange rate parity. Expectedly, the appetite of London 
investors for Greek bonds declined en masse and, as result, the Greek 
economy was suffering both from credit shortage and capital flights 
abroad that were further exacerbating domestic contraction. In such an 
adverse international environment, Greece was refusing to consider a 
devaluation of the Drachma and vowed to bear any cost for staying in 
the system. But this was only making investors even more uncertain and 
speculators even more determined. The fight for the GES at the end 
became ideological and soon lost touch with the reality of markets. 
Adopting the economic orthodoxies prevailing at that time, the Greek 
Government ignored the perils of recession and embarked on an 
overzealous fiscal stance to convince worrying foreign investors about its 
determination to stay in the system. The preoccupation with fiscal and 
monetary straightjackets was so overwhelming, that the Party of Liberals 
opposed even its own previous legislation on a social security system 
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and work-time regulations, disregarding hostility from the unions and 
risking social unrest. The fiscal effort was effective, and Figure 5 shows 
that it managed to achieve small budget surpluses in 1931. But in spite 
of the success in harnessing the deficit, the economy was reaching its 
limits when major new shocks occurred shortly. 
 
3.  Sliding on the golden edge: fight, flight and failure 
The Greek Government was taken by sheer surprise when the UK 
abandoned the GES in September 1931 and devalued by 35% to the US 
Dollar. The move was declared by Greek authorities
4
 as “the strongest 
possible shock”, and quickly reverberated on many fronts. Politically, the 
Government lost face as the unilateral act tarnished its long-nourished 
reputation for being a strategic partner with the UK. In financial terms, 
distress was even harder. As noted by Eichengreen (2012), the Bank of 
England had previously reassured foreign central banks of its unwavering 
support for the prevailing sterling exchange rate. Convinced of such 
assurances, Greece had augmented foreign reserves in pound sterling 
just a few months before by selling gold to the Bank of England, thus 
incurring sizeable losses on the eve of the British abandonment. As a 
scapegoat, the Governor of the Bank of Greece was asked to resign the 
very same day. 
Instead of the Drachma following the British move and depreciate 
analogously, Greece acted with the perseverance of a late proselyte. The 
determination to stay in the GES was reaffirmed in a joint meeting 
                                                 
4
 Bank of Greece, 1932, “The Governor’s Report for Year 1931”, (ch. xii), as quoted by 
Psalidopoulos (2011, p. 85). 
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between the Prime Minister, Central Bank and commercial banks. The 
decision was openly objected by the Chief Economist of the Bank and 
the League of Nations representative in Greece
5
, but their argument was 
fiercely opposed by commercial banks that feared their reserves would 
be diminished by a drastic devaluation
6
. The Government finally vowed 
to stay in the GES by shifting the peg to the US Dollar at the rate implied 
before the devaluation of the British pound, (i.e. 375 Drs per BPS/4.866 
BPS per USD = 77.05 Drachmas per Dollar). To reassure markets about 
their stance, authorities moved decisively in three ways:  
First, by adhering to a rigorous fiscal stance as described above. The 
political investment to the GES was so deeply rooted that it made the 
Government to ignore the recessionary effects and the steep rise in 
unemployment; see Figure 6 and 7 respectively. Even left-wing radicals 
in the Party of Liberals went to the point to criticize the Government for 
not being as determined as to reduce public consumption further 
(Mazower, 2002, p 215).  
Second, by raising the Bank lending rate in order to restrain domestic 
credit expansion. As often happens in similar cases, playing with high 
interest rates was considered as a political show-off against speculators. 
In a defiant mood, the Prime Minister himself called authorities “… not 
to hesitate to raise interest rates to 20% or even to 50% if deemed 
necessary”, (Mazower, 2002, p 211).  
                                                 
5
 As described in Bank of Greece (1978), The first fifty years, p. 93. 
6
 Commenting upon a similar decision by the UK the year before, Keynes noted that ‘…the 
decision to maintain the gold standard at all costs has been taken … in a spirit of hysteria and 
without a calm consideration of the alternative before us’, (in the essay “On the eve of the 
Gold suspension”, 1931). 
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Third, by imposing capital controls to curb the ensuing capital flight. 
Market players considered this decision as a ‘de facto’ partial 
abandonment of convertibility, and fears spread that the country may 
eventually exit the system, and expectations were adjusted accordingly. 
The decision to suspend the Stock Exchange in September 1931 in order 
to avoid sell-out hysteria fuelled more fears that the Government is in a 
precarious situation and may not succeed for long in keeping with the 
GES. 
Domestic funds were fleeing for yet another time and authorities 
responded by setting interest rates even higher and the discount rate 
climbed up to 12%; see Figure 8. But such a rise was choking off liquidity, 
thus aggravating the dysfunction of the economy and reinforcing 
pessimistic expectations in the market. Access to international 
borrowing was further curtailed and the government was in a difficult 
situation, since it was strategically dependent on international capital 
inflows and ‘… their shortage was making it inactive and waiting, with 
the hope that eventually flows would start again’; see (Mazower, 2002, 
p. 214). 
With credibility undermined from the start, panic and speculation soon 
reigned in and sparked a chain of events. As contraction in activity and 
liquidity led to widespread protests in the autumn of 1931, industries 
pressed commercial banks to raise liquidity capital. With much of private 
deposits withdrawn by worried creditors, commercial banks turned for 
help to the Central Bank, thus effectively enforcing her to act as “a 
lender of last resort” and sacrifice a substantial part of its foreign 
reserves.  
 14 
The effectiveness of monetary policy was put in further doubt when the 
Bank of Greece took the controversial decision to provide credit facilities 
directly to industry. Mazower (2002, p 199) attributes the action to the 
ambition of the Bank of Greece to antagonize commercial banks by 
opening new branches and offering cheap loans to selected local 
markets. Kostis (1986) describes this phenomenon as a “complete 
paradox” which undermined efficacy at critical moments, while 
Minoglou (1995) asserts that confusion between its supervisory and 
credit-providing roles perpetuated the crisis. Whatever the motivation, 
the result of further credit expansion was that foreign exchange reserves 
were depleted fast as shown in Figure 9, precipitating the abandonment 
of the regime as analyzed in the next section. 
With reserves depleting, a proposal was publicly put forward
7
 for Greece 
to declare a unilateral moratorium on debt payments. The Government 
initially rejected the proposal, but then included a softer version of it in a 
last attempt to defend its position. Seeking financial assistance from the 
League of Nations and the UK, Greece asked in January 1932 for a 5-year 
moratorium on foreign debt servicing and a new loan of pound sterling 
12.5 million to finance infrastructural projects and enhance growth. 
After months of procrastination, the League rejected the request
8
 and 
the Government finally realized that the situation was no more 
defensible. To avoid a disorderly collapse, a Law was passed by 
Parliament and the system was officially abandoned in April 1932. The 
Drachma devalued and subsequently foreign obligations were 
                                                 
7
 By D. Maximos, Governor of the National Bank of Greece and later Prime Minister; see 
Bank of Greece (1978, p 98). 
8
 It agreed only to a brief postponement of debt repayment,  utterly  insufficient to reverse 
the situation, Bank of Greece (1978, p. 100), 
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repudiated. Post-default, the Bank of Greece sought a compromise with 
foreign bond-holders proposing to compensate them at 30% of the 
nominal value. After some initial protestations, most holders had 
accepted the offer by the end of 1932. 
The economic consequences of devaluation were mixed. Since the 
abandonment of the GES took place not as a controlled shift in economic 
strategy but as an unavoidable failure of policy, it did not usher in a 
period of stability. The ensuing inflation in 1932 (Figure 2) cut real 
wages, but industrial production continue to shrink and rose mildly only 
after 1933 (Figure 6) Trade balance improved, as shown in Figure 4, but 
the improvement came mainly from the reduction of imports
9
 by USD 49 
million due to the fall of real incomes and the imposition of tariffs. At the 
same time exports fell too by USD 20 million, most probably because 
protectionism was spreading in many European countries inhibiting an 
export-led growth in other economies. In 1934 both exports and imports 
were -45% lower than their 1931levels, thus trade imbalance was also 
reduced by nearly half. 
Agricultural production did not rise, suffering from the contraction of 
world demand, while rural incomes were falling due to the deterioration 
in the terms of trade. In some sectors the decline was massive. For 
example, the production of tobacco was halved in 1932 in comparison to 
the previous year, causing abject poverty
10
 and fermenting political 
discontent.  
                                                 
9
 Data are taken from Bank of Greece (1978), The first fifty years, Table 10, p. 105. 
10
 In his description of the period, Psalidopoulos (2011, p. 69) notes that the rural 
populations were living in “desperate conditions”. 
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In spite of the devaluation, uncertainties continued to prevail in the 
labour market. Several firms were finding it easier to meet higher 
production by extending work time rather than hiring new employees, at 
least before the political and social situation is stabilized. In such an 
environment employment exhibited a strong hysteresis and did not 
recover along the rise in industrial production. In 1932, employment 
ended almost 15% lower according to Lazaretou (2009, p 34) and 
unemployment kept rising as depicted in Figure 7. Employment 
hysteresis was also the case in other countries for the same reason of 
widespread uncertainties. For example, Blanchard and Summers (1986) 
note the persistent increase in unemployment in the US in the 1930s, 
which only subsided during the War. Unemployment in Greece declined 
only in the second half of the decade after major political changes have 
taken place that brutally destroyed trade unions and sent their 
representatives in exile. 
The political fall-out was dramatic, and in the next four years the country 
went through a unique process of disintegration and chaos. There have 
been four elections (1932, 1933, 1935 and 1936), an assassination 
attempt against the crisis Prime Minister, one election boycott and four 
military coup d’ etats. The first two attempts of seizing power were 
initiated by supporters of the Party of Liberals and, after failing, their 
leaders were summarily executed. the third coup was pro-royal and 
managed to restore the monarchy through an allegedly rigged 
referendum. As unemployment continued to surge, social clashes 
intensified and finally a pro-fascist dictatorship was imposed by yet 
another coup in 1936. 
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4.  Modeling the currency crisis 
To study the interaction between pressure on the exchange rate and 
depletion of foreign exchange reserves, a simple dynamic model is set 
up. It broadly falls in the framework of Balance of Payments crises, 
properly modified to reflect particular developments during the Greek 
crisis. Variables are in Roman case, expressed in continuous-time, with 
an over-dot denoting time-derivatives, superscript (e) expectations, 
small case expressing natural logarithms, and a star indicating 
equilibrium values. Parameters are in Greek case. 
The Central Bank:  
The exchange rate is fixed at a predetermined level 0X X=  of domestic 
units per foreign currency of the anchor country, so that an increase in X 
denotes depreciation.  Other countries in the GES are assumed to have 
an average exchange rate Z vis-à-vis the anchor currency, so that the 
bilateral exchange rate of home country is X/Z of domestic units per 
currency of non-anchor members. 
The Bank controls money supply (M) so as to keep domestic inflation (π) 
at the same level as other GES countries, i.e. 
Wpi pi≈ , ensuring purchasing 
power parity under the peg. The Central Bank keeps international assets 
(Q), the major part of which is held in interest-bearing accounts in 
foreign currency and the rest in gold. For simplicity, it is assumed that a 
uniform return equal to the foreign interest rate (r) is paid on the total 
stock of reserves and the net profit ( )rQ Q
•
−  is collected by the 
Government. The balance sheet of the Central Bank in domestic book 
value requires that 
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D Q X M+ ⋅ =             (1) 
where (D) is domestic credit. To sterilize changes in reserves from 
reaching the money aggregates, credit is adjusted to changes in foreign 
reserves.  
The real economy:  
The resource constraint implies that 
                 JGICY +++=                                              (2) 
where Y is output produced in the economy. C is consumption, J denotes 
exports net of imports and G is public spending, while private 
investment ( I ) is assumed exogenous in the short run and thus the 
capital stock does not interact with the rest of the model. However, a 
rudimentary process of labour demand can be modeled to account for 
the persistence of unemployment discussed in the previous section. If 
( L ) households supply their labour, a linear production function with 
constant returns to scale can be written as ( )Y Lh= Φ ⋅ , where (h) is 
worktime and (Φ) a technology constant. The number of employees is 
adjusted with a hysteresis, at a rate  
( )YL L
h
λ= −
Φ

      (3) 
The higher the value of parameter (λ), the slower the adjustment of 
employment to new demand. Given that worktime regulation was very 
weak, an increase in production could be absorbed by extending working 
hours, so again unemployment could persist in spite of the rise in 
output.  
  19 
Domestic households receive all the income and invest their savings on 
Government bonds with a return (R). Assuming a lump-sum tax ( T ) on 
households, the Private Sector Constraint (PSC) dictates that changes in 
their wealth (A) are given by 
( )A RA Y C T I
•
= + − − −       (4)  
The Government:  
The Government issues a total stock of debt (B), which is financed by 
domestic households (A) and foreign capital inflows (F). The Government 
budget constraint (GBC) requires that:  
               B RB G T Q rQ
• •
= + − + −                                   (5) 
In 1931-32 authorities were maintaining a balanced budget policy, as it is 
clearly demonstrated in Figure 4. To capture this fact, fiscal policy is 
considered exogenously set, as in Krugman (1978) and Calvo (1987), in 
such a way as to keep gross budget deficits at zero level. Hence, there is 
no need for further modelling the intertemporal budget constraint.  
Domestic assets (R) differ from the yield (r) on foreign assets by a 
sovereign spread ( s R r= − ). Differentiating total debt (B=A+F), using (4), 
(5) and the output identity (2), new capital inflows in each period are 
given by: 
( )F r s F Q rQ J
• •
= + + − −                                  (6) 
The equation represents the External Solvency Constraint (ESC). It is 
obvious that by observing GBC and ESC, the process PSC is also 
stabilized. The constraint implies that in each period, new capital flows 
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are needed to finance the trade deficit ( J− ) and the interest payments 
to foreign investors, as well as to raise foreign exchange reserves on a 
net basis. As a matter of fact, one third of the Stabilization Loan of £ 9 
million issued in London in 1927 on behalf of the Hellenic Republic was 
earmarked for setting up the reserves of the Central Bank.  
In the absence of inflation differentials, net exports are approximated by 
an increasing function of nominal exchange log-rates (x) and (x-z) vis-à-
vis the anchor and the non-anchor countries respectively, and an index 
of world demand (W), while decreasing with domestic demand, i.e. 
0 1 2 3 4( )J x x z W Yβ β β β β= + ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅     (7) 
Parameters 1 2,β β  are proxies for price elasticities of net exports, 3 4,β β   
are the propensities of foreign and domestic demand respectively, and 
0β  is a constant. 
Capital markets:  
In the models developed by Krugman (1979) and Calvo (1987), collapse 
occurs at some predetermined point in time when foreign reserves are 
exhausted by a constant rate of credit expansion known to the market 
players. Foreseeing this, they organize a speculative attack and the 
system collapses before all reserves are depleted. That was not the case 
in Greece in 1931-32, for two reasons: First, because credit provision 
was occasionally boosted by the Central Bank as described in the 
previous section, making it to resemble more with the stochastic setting 
developed by Flood and Garber (1984). Second because of the presence 
of capital controls, that did not allow market players to fully enforce 
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their strategy. To treat this analytically, suppose that the extent of 
capital controls is measured by (θ).  
In the absence of controls (θ=0), sovereign yield spreads cover the 
depreciation expected to take place in the eventuality of the peg 
collapsing. On the other hand, if fully constrained by capital controls 
(θ=1), market participants would form expectations by calculating some 
kind of pressure on the currency.  If, for example, they think that a viable 
exchange rate should be at a new level (U), the pressure is expressed in 
log terms by (u-x). The viable level (u) is not known with certainty
11
 and 
perceptions about it may change. This makes the time of collapse not 
perfectly foreseen by market participants. With capital controls partly 
effective (0<θ<1), the expectation of exchange rate depreciation is given 
in log-form by: 
(1 )( ) ( )ex R r u xθ θγ= − − + −

          (8) 
where (γ) is a ‘pressure’ parameter
12
. As a matter of fact, capital controls 
imposed in 1931 were only partly observed and the Governor of the 
Bank was sacked in account of his inability to fully enforce them. 
In a currency peg, the spread is a typical measure of nervousness in the 
forex market and currency crises are almost invariably preceded by 
explosive patterns of spreads. An index of exchange market pressure 
based on the evolution of spreads and international reserves was initially 
proposed by the seminal paper of Girton and Roper (1977), and 
                                                 
11
 In 1932 there was a vast disagreement on what would be the adjustment rate in case the 
Drachma abandoned the GES, see Mazower (2002, p. 233) 
12
 In the first term of the r.h.s., capital controls act as a tax on profits from forex 
transactions, as described in Agenor and Flood (1994). 
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subsequently a vast number of applications employed  similar measures 
for the identification of a currency crisis; see, among many others,  
Eichengreen et al. (1995). The justification is that low spreads are 
associated with credible exchange rate regimes, while high premia unveil 
uncertainty about their viability. In the approach by Hellwig et al. (2006), 
investors take into account the risk of default, thus the gap between 
demand and supply of domestic bonds closes by offering satisfactorily 
high spreads over the foreign yield. This is a mechanism that may lead to 
a currency crisis, if investors have pre-committed to liquidate after 
spreads reach a “threshold point”. Krugman (1991) refers to several 
occasions that a currency regime is at risk to explode if future contracts 
with automatic clauses are activated after certain safety margins are 
reached. As highlighted by Dornbush (1991), the fear felt by the 
individual investor that - unless a currency position is reversed 
immediately - major losses may happen later, leads to “bandwagon” 
effects and soon the market fails. In other cases a run-away may be 
triggered simply when investors are risk-averse and adopt stop-loss 
schemes to limit their exposure. In all these cases, the behaviour of 
spreads becomes strategic for the survival of the currency regime. 
In practice the evolution of spreads and reserves may not be 
independent from each other. As studied by Lahiri and Vegh (2007), 
authorities may also be preoccupied by hikes in spreads not just because 
the higher cost of debt servicing, but also because of the effect that 
rising interest rates exert on domestic activity.  In such cases, authorities 
may sacrifice part of foreign exchange reserves to boost credit according 
to (1) and thus domestic demand. Reflecting the above, a simple 
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negative relationship
13
 between sovereign spreads and the stock of 
reserves is postulated as: 
 s Qσ η= −       (9) 
where (σ, η) are parameters
14
. To empirically investigate the interaction 
between spread and reserves in the 1930s, one needs high frequency 
data, especially for the period of crisis.  Though monthly data for 
sovereign yields have been calculated by the Bank of Greece and span 
the period 1929-1940, they are missing for the critical period as the 
Athens Stock Exchange was suspended from September 1931 until 
March 1932. Taking into account that the majority of foreign bond 
holders were British
15
,, the sovereign spread is constructed by taking the 
difference between Greek yields quoted in London and the yield on the 
2.5% British consol. As shown in Figure 8, sovereign bond yields quoted 
in London were comparable with those in Athens until September 1931. 
A strong negative correlation with foreign reserves as implied by (9) is 
displayed in Figure 10. 
Data series
16
 are found to imply that Granger-causality from reserves to 
spreads cannot be rejected at the 1% level, while it is heavily so the 
other way around. Using a dummy for the increased market pressure 
                                                 
13
 A negative relationship between foreign reserves and sovereign spreads has been 
examined for Greece during the period 1994-2000 of convergence to the European 
Monetary Union by Christodoulakis (2010). 
14
 In expression (9) the depletion of reserves accelerates the fear of a regime collapsing, and 
this may also be taken to imply that sovereign spreads are influenced by the collapse 
probability as described in Krugman and Obstfeld (1991). 
15
According to the Bank of Greece (1978, p. 107), 67% of foreign creditors were British, 10% 
US and 7.5% French,. 
16
 Similar findings are established when the differential between the Central Banks’ discount 
rates in Greece and UK is employed instead of the sovereign yield. Results are available upon 
request. 
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after the UK abandoned the GES, estimates are obtained for the 
following more general form: 
0 1 2
3 4
  * ( -1) * ( -1)
*[   ( -1)] * _ _ _1931
spread a a spread t a reserves t
a change in reserves t a UK post Sept
= + −
− +  (10) 
Various forms are estimated including absolute or proportional changes 
in reserves and shown in Table 2 in Appendix C. Parameter values are 
found correctly signed and statistically significant in all cases, and this is 
taken as supportive evidence for the postulated relationship. To avoid 
unnecessary complications
17
, the simpler expression (9) is subsequently 
used in studying the dynamics of the model.  
Dynamics 
As described in the previous section, new financing from abroad was 
dried-up after the pound exited the GES in September 1931
18
, and Figure 
1 shows that debt remained virtually the same between 1931 and 1932. 
To capture the paucity of borrowing, foreign debt liabilities (F) are 
assumed to remain constant, i.e. 
_
0 and F F F
•
= ≈ . Substituting (9) into (6) 
and (8), the dynamics of foreign reserves and the exchange rate are 
finally obtained as: 
_ _
0 1 2 2 3 4( ) ( ) ( )Q r F Q x z W Y r Fη β β β β β β σ= + ⋅ + + + − + − − + ⋅

  (11a)   
(1 ) ( ) (1 )ex Q u xη θ θγ θ σ= − − ⋅ + ⋅ − + −

        (11b) 
                                                 
17
  When the full form (10) is used, a similar solution is obtained, though the analysis 
becomes more complicated without adding any new insight. Details are given in Appendix B. 
18
 According to Psalidopoulos (2011) the Government made desperate attempts for a new 
loan, but “international financial markets, on which Greece was relying for its needs in 
capital flows, were not responding to the Greek appeals”, (p. 69, my translation). 
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Equation (11a) describes that reserves accumulate by trade surpluses 
and diminish by payments to foreign debt holders. Equation (11b) 
implies that depreciation expectations increase when reserves are 
diminished and/or devaluation pressure (u-x) rises. This is a situation 
analogous to that described by Dornbusch (1987), where the 
expectations of market agents regarding the transition from a fixed to a 
floating regime are influenced by reserves behaviour and devaluation 
pressure in each period, as expressed by the first and second term in the 
r.h.s. respectively. 
The solution is described in Appendix B and, conditional on a minimum 
degree of capital controls, is found to be saddle-path stable at point (E0) 
as shown in Figure 11. 
When an adverse shock impinges upon the domestic economy, say due 
to a permanent depreciation of the non-anchor countries exchange rate 
(z → z+dz), or a world depression ( )W W dW→ −  the saddle-path moves 
upwards. The new equilibrium is obtained at (E1), which implies a higher 
(i.e. depreciated) exchange rate 1X , as shown in Figure 12. In a currency 
peg there are three options to confront this situation: 
(i) Defense: As turned out to be the case in practice, authorities chose to 
stay in the system and defend the exchange rate parity. In the graphics 
of Figure 12, this implies that the system slides along the horizontal 
locus at 0X X=  while foreign exchange reserves are depleting, (i.e. Q is 
falling). When they reach a critical level (QMIN) the system is abandoned 
and the exchange rate overshoots to the saddle-path at point 2E  from 
which it subsequently free- floats to the new equilibrium 1E . The time 
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profile in Figure 13 closely resembles the actual trajectory of exchange 
rate overshooting and adjustment that took place in 1932-33 and is 
shown in Figure 3.  
Following the currency path, net exports rise strongly in the aftermath of 
devaluation, though later somewhat decline due to the partial 
revaluation 2 1E E  towards the new equilibrium. The pattern shown in 
Figure 14 captures the actual behaviour shown in Figure 4. The 
improvement in the trade balance gradually augments foreign reserves, 
though not necessarily to the same level as before the crisis. The reason 
might be that the risk premium had risen (i.e. a higher σ ) or  in the 
meanwhile capital controls were expanded (i.e. a higher θ ), hence the 
asymmetric post-collapse rise in Figure 15. Again, this is in line with the 
actual accumulation pattern of reserves after 1932 as depicted in Figure 
9. 
(ii) Adjust to a new exchange rate 1X : Though the option was advanced 
by some officials as mentioned in the previous section, it finally did not 
go through. If chosen, it would have implied an immediate depreciation 
of the Drachma against the anchor currency by an amount so as to 
neutralize the British depreciation and world recession without affecting 
the reserves. From (11a) the extent of a viable depreciation is easily 
obtained as:  
 
2 3
1 2
1
* [ ]dx dz dWβ ββ β= ⋅ −+     (12) 
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(iii) Foreign debt forgiveness: Another way to keep the system in the 
initial equilibrium 0X  would be to have foreign debt liabilities cut to such 
an extent dF<0 as to compensate for the adverse effect of both world 
recession ( )dW−  and hostile devaluation (dz). Though proposed in the 
beginning of 1932, the option was never seriously considered, as such a 
mechanism did not exist in the institutional setting of the 1930s and 
every country was left to defend its position unilaterally. In the 
hypothetical case that debt forgiveness were applied, its extent
19
 should 
be such that (11a) remained intact despite of the external shocks, i.e. 
2 3
1
* [ ]dF dz dW
r
β β
σ
= − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅
+     (13) 
A comparison of expressions (12) and (13) with the actual depreciation 
and debt repudiation that took place in 1932 can be made by setting 
plausible parameter values as illustrated in Appendix B. 
 
5. Conclusions  
In the 1930s, Greek economic policy was trying to restructure parochial 
relations in key sectors ranging from banking to agriculture, to build 
productive infrastructure in order to close the gap of regional 
inequalities, and at the same time to become an equal partner in 
shaping European politics. Joining the club of the Gold Exchange 
                                                 
19
 To obtain a meaningful result, variables in equations (6) and (11a) should be expressed as 
proportion to GDP with (r+σ) replaced by (r+σ-n), where (n) is the nominal growth rate. 
However, this would not much affect expression (13) as inflation at that time was running at 
-0.70% and growth stagnated, so that practically 0.n ≈  
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Standard seemed to be a political and financial ‘zeitgeist’, and Greece 
rightly vowed to participate.  
In spite of persistent and well-intentioned domestic policies, the 
outcome of the project was negative. The reasons are not due to any 
historical predicament of inescapable failure, but to a number of specific 
mistakes and policy debacles, such as the following:  
i. The choice of fixing the exchange rate to another country’s currency, 
with which Greek trade was limited, made the Drachma 
uncompetitive towards other economies and soon after the country 
experienced large external deficits. As a result, foreign debt had to 
remain in relatively high levels despite the lower servicing costs, both 
in order to finance external deficits and also to accumulate foreign 
reserves.  
ii. Greek authorities had a rare opportunity to correct the misguided 
exchange rate by following the Bank of England in the steep 
devaluation of the pound in 1931. Given that Greece had organized all 
of its monetary structures as a faithful follower to the British policy, 
the move not only would have been completely justified on economic 
grounds but also utterly defensible from the point of view of 
international obligations. 
iii. Domestic policy targets for creating a dynamic business sector and 
generating employment were eventually hindered by the stringency 
of credit availability. With the Government at the same time pursuing 
a tough fiscal policy, the economy was soon trapped in recession and 
this further undermined business prospects and employment.  
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iv. The Government never fully endorsed the principle that the Central 
Bank should be institutionally separated from commercial banking 
activities. The nascent authority was neither granted full 
independence from the Government, nor avoided mixing up with 
lending policies and concerns, even when critical decisions should 
have been taken in utter confidentiality. The ‘amalgamation’ with 
commercial practices caused confusion about its true preferences and 
undermined effectiveness in conducting the monetary policy.  
v. The external environment was not conducive in the 1930s, as 
European nations were lacking institutional coordination and 
mechanisms of credit facilitation to stressed countries. In the event of 
the crisis, every member of the system was left alone and soon was it 
succumbing to the growing pressure. Especially after the Bank of 
England abandoned GES, there was a fire-sale of sterling reserves and 
this led to a great scarcity of credit availability. No nation was eager to 
undertake part of Greek foreign liabilities, and it was even impossible 
for the Government to borrow even at the prevailing rates. To avoid 
the same omissions, a crucial component of the post-war system was 
the emergency finance mechanism to assist economies in a credit 
crunch. 
Counting on the above arguments, it seems that at no point of time was 
there anything fatalistic about the course of events. Rather than seeing 
Greece as inescapably succumbing to adversities, it is clear that several 
consequences could have been mitigated or avoided under a different 
decision-making process. Episodes are not repeated in history, and this 
applies equally to successes as well as to failures. Greece today is not 
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doomed by the crisis in the 1930s, given of course that policy failures are 
well understood both by current Greek authorities and their partners in 
the Eurozone.  
To counter fatalistic clichés, it is perhaps useful to draw a parallel on 
another Gold-related episode from antiquity, where Greeks were more 
successful than in the 1930s. After a well-planned campaign, ancient 
Greeks managed to acquire back the Golden Fleece that was seized by a 
foreign power. The King of Colchis agreed to hand it over, conditional on 
Jason performing three tasks: first, to yoke some fire-breathing oxen and 
use them to plough a field sowing dragon-teeth; second, to defeat an 
army of warriors sprouting out of the field of dragon-teeth; last, to 
subjugate the dragon. With the help of the Gods, Jason succeeded in all 
tasks, killing the dragon in his sleep. If one takes the fire-breathing oxen 
to symbolize the speculators under the currency peg and the teeth to be 
the external deficits sprouting the army of unemployment in the 1930s, 
then international markets should be the dragon, alas not quite in 
dormant. And, unlike Jason, Greece was left alone and could not 
adequately cope with the challenge. Greece today relies on the 
assistance of the international financial system and its Eurozone 
partners to help put the dragon under control. Given of course that the 
final move will still have to be by Jason himself, and Greece should by all 
means strive to put the house in order.  
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Appendix A. Graphs 
 
Figure 1. 
Public debt of Central Government, in million LMU Drachmas. 
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Source: Bank of Greece. End-of-year data. Figures express total liabilities of the Greek state 
including interest payments and amortization in gold, foreign exchange and banknotes,  
Note: Before the establishment of Central Bank in 1928, obligations were to the National 
Bank of Greece. From 1928 to 1939 the series refers to the net claims of the Bank of Greece 
against Central Government, regardless the nationality of the creditor and/or currency 
denomination of debt.  
 
Figure 2. 
Annual inflation rate in Greece, 1918-1937. 
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Source: Ministry of National Economy, Annuaire statistique.  
Note: Inflation was proxied by the annual changes of an index of the cost of living, and is 
likely to underestimate the true figures.  
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Figure 3. 
The Drachma exchange rate vis-à-vis the US Dollar (left-hand scale) and the 
British Pound (right-hand scale). A rise indicates depreciation. 
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Source: Ministry of National Economy, Annuaire Statistique. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 
Trade balance and Current Account balance in Greece, million US Dollars. 
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Sources: (i) Supreme Economic Council, Indexes of economic activity of Greece 1928-1934, 
1935, p.17. (ii)  Bank of Greece, Annual Reports. 
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Figure 5. 
Budget deficit in Greece, million US Dollars. 
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Source: Ministry of National Economy, Annuaire Statistique. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 
Index of annual industrial production. Base year 1928=100. 
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Source:  Supreme Economic Council, Indices of economic activity 1928-1934, 1935.  
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Figure 7. 
Number of unemployed. 
Number of unemployed
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Source:  Kostis K., Banks and the crisis, 1929-1932, Athens 1986, p.139. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  
Greek sovereign yields quoted in London and in Athens. The yield quoted in 
Greece is calculated as the simple average of monthly reported yields on Greek 
bonds issued at 1881,1884,1887,1889, 1890, 1902, 1907, 1910 and 1914. 
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Source: Bank of Greece, annualized rates, and  Global  Financial Data, GFD.  
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Figure 9. 
 Foreign reserves in million of LMU Drachmas 
Total Reserves, mio LMU Drs
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Note: Total reserves (gold, foreign exchange, government bonds in gold), end-of-month data, 
not seasonally adjusted. Source: Bank of Greece  
 
 
Figure 10.  
Correlation between yield spreads and foreign reserves for the period before 
the regime collapsing, 1928:05-1932:03.  
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Source: Monthly data, as in Figure 8 and 9 respectively. Reserves in LMU Drs billion. 
Note: Data for reserves express end-of-month stocks, while spreads are monthly averages. 
For this reason, the diagram displays the reserves lagged one month. 
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Figure 11. 
 Saddle-path equilibrium of the exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves. 
Small arrows indicate the dynamics of adjustment according to (11a, b). 
 
 
 
Figure 12. 
The new saddle-path after a permanent shock in the form of a deterioration of 
competitiveness and/or a fall in world demand 
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Figure 13. 
The response of the exchange rate. Actual profile shown in Figure 3. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. 
The response of the trade balance. Actual profile shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 15. 
The response of foreign exchange reserves. Actual profile shown in Figure 9. 
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Appendix B. Modelling the currency peg 
 
The dynamics of foreign reserves and exchange rate described by (11a, b) are 
written in state-space form for [ Q  x  ] as: 
__
0 2 3 41 2 ( )( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )e
z W Y r Fr F QQ
x x u
β β β β ση β β
η θ θγ θ σ θγ
  
− + − − + ⋅+ +      
     = ⋅ +     
   − − − − +      
   


    (14) 
The steady-state conditions ( 0 and  0Q x
• •
= = ) imply the following equilibrium 
loci for the foreign exchange reserves and the exchange rate as 
__
2 3 4 0
1 2 1 2
( )0 * * z W Y r Fr FQ x Q β β β σ βηβ β β β
•
− + + + ⋅ −+
= ⇒ = − ⋅ +
+ +
          (15a) 
1 10 * *x x Q uθ θη σ
θγ θ
•
− −
= ⇒ = − + +             (15b) 
The two loci are shown in Figure 11. From (15a) and (15b), it is easy to show 
that the equilibrium (x*, Q*) at point (E0) is reached only on the specific 
saddle-path P0P0.  
For a unique equilibrium to exist the determinant of the transition matrix in 
(14) should be negative or, equivalently in graphical terms, the slope of 
exchange rate locus should algebraically exceed that of the reserves locus, i.e. 
_
1 2
(1 ) r Fη θ η
θγ β β
− +
− > −
+
     (16) 
This is satisfied with a degree of sufficiently effective capital controls, so that 
_
1 2
 1
1 ( )
r F
M IN
ηγ
η β βθ θ
−
 
+ +
 +
 
> =    (17) 
If θ is insufficient (θ < θMIN) then the system is not saddle-path stable and the 
only possible outcome is the regime immediately collapsing and going to a new 
equilibrium at (E1).   
 
Calibration:  
It is interesting to see under which parameter values expressions (12) and (13) 
give the extent of devaluation and debt forgiveness that actually have taken 
place after the collapse. One year after abandoning the GES, the Drachma 
reached the level of 1 108X =  Drs per US dollar, and this is taken to imply that a 
depreciation by 40%, i.e. dx*=0.40, would have led to a sustainable rate. 
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Similarly, the actual repudiation of bond values imposed by the Bank of Greece 
in 1932 was up to 70%, and this is taken to imply that a debt forgiveness of 
* 0.70dF = −  would suffice to calm the pressure during the crisis. 
Since in 1931 the British pound was devalued by 35% and world trade was 
contracted by 25% relative to 1929, the shocks are set equal to 0.35dz = and 
0.25dW = −  respectively. Finally, the British yield was at that time r=0.05 and  
σ=0.07 as in the linear fit in Figure 10. Substituting in (12) and (13), parameter 
values have to satisfy  
1 2 0.25β β+ ≈      (18a) 
2 30.35 0.25 0.084β β+ ≈     (18b) 
For an illustration, one can set 3 0.20 β = and from the above expressions 
obtain 1 20.15, 0.10β β= =  which look quite plausible as net export elasticities 
of Drachma exchange rates to the US and UK currencies respectively.  
 
Three-dimensional dynamics: 
In complete form, expression (10) implies in continuous time the dynamics of 
spreads: 
 0 1 2 3s s Q Qα α α α= + − −
 
     (19) 
The resulting system is now three-dimensional in [ Q  x  s] , and using (6) and 
(8) the transition matrix is obtained as:  
_
1 2
_
2 3 3 1 2 1 3
( )
0 (1 )
( ) ( ) ( )
r F
r F
β β
γθ θ
α α α β β α α
 
+ − 
 Λ = − −
 
 
− + − + + 
    (20) 
For a unique saddle-path solution to exist, there must be two negative and one 
positive characteristic roots. The determinant should be positive and a 
sufficient condition for the existence of at least one negative root is that the 
trace of the above matrix is negative. After some trivial manipulations, the two 
conditions lead to a minimum of capital controls: 
1
_
_
2 1
1 3
2 1 2
m ax [ , ]1 2
( ) / , 11 2 ( )
F r
r F
θ θ θ
α αθ α α γ θ γ
α β β
−
>
 
− = + + = +
 +
 
   (21) 
For 0 1 2 3, 1, , 0α σ α α η α= = − = = , expression  (10) is simplified to (9) and 
condition (21) collapses to (17). 
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Appendix C. Data analysis  
 
 
Table 1.  
Granger Causality Tests 
  Sample: 1928:05 1932:04     Lags: 2  Obs=46 
  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
Spread does not Granger Cause Reserves 0.53353 0.59055 
Reserves does not Granger Cause Spread 5.77624 0.00616 
 
 
Table 2.  
Alternative Estimates of (10), standard errors in parentheses 
 
Spread (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
constant 
3.743939 
(0.531701) 
3.938652* 
(1.440388) 
6.149293 
(1.008487) 
0.770429* 
(0.314777) 
1.082493 
(0.310770) 
Spread(-1) _ 
0.436124* 
(0.203506) 
_ 
0.665949 
(0.129314) 
0.529201 
(0.129106) 
Reserves(-1) 
-0.384274* 
(0.153443) 
-0.836842* 
(0.350137) 
-1.119108 
(0.321451) 
_ _ 
ΔReserves(-1) _ _ _ 
-0.912717* 
(0.418890) 
_ 
ΔReserves(-1)/ 
Reserves(-2) 
_ _ _ _ 
-4.472152* 
(1.242741) 
UK_dummy 
2.152020 
(0.297289) 
0.941012* 
(0.390253) 
1.820267 
(0.395471) 
1.275664 
(0.296531) 
1.375576 
(0.275535) 
AR(1) _  
0.835149 
(0.106121) 
_ _ 
Fstat 89.87 63.52704 117.14 109.95 132.11 
R2 0.80 0.878266 
 
0.88 0.88 
 
0.90 
DW 0.65 1.718130 1.72 1.96 1.94 
 
Note: A star indicates significance at the 5% level. All other estimated coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level. Sample: 1928:05 1932:03, obs=45. OLS and AR(1). 
The dummy is set to one from 1931:09-1932:03 and zero elsewhere. Δ denotes first 
difference. Data sources: See Figure 8, 9. Reserves in LMU Drs billion. 
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